1) Search and Satisficing
(with Andrew Caplin and Mark Dean) [Appendix and Instructions]
American Economic Review, 2011
Summary: We develop a search-theoretic choice experiment to study the impact of incomplete consideration on choice quality. We find that decisions can be understood using the satisficing model of Herbert Simon.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
2) A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception
(with Andrew Caplin)
Economic Journal, 2015
Summary: We introduce “state-dependent stochastic choice data” and an axiom called “No Improving Action Switches” (NIAS) that characterizes the choice behavior of an agent with private information about states of the world.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Previous: NBER Working Paper 17163 (experimental test)
Previous: Framing Effects and Optimization (framing effects)
3) Measuring Rationality with the Minimum Cost of Revealed Preference Violations
(with Mark Dean) [Appendix]
Review of Economics and Statistics, 2016
Summary: We offer a new measure of how close a set of choices is to satisfying the observable implications of preference maximization and apply it to a large, balanced panel of household level consumption data.
Topics: Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files, Updated MCI Files, MCI Source Code
Previous: Testing for Rationality with Consumption Data (preference homogeneity)
Previous: How Rational are your Choice Data? (experiment, number of preferences)
Recommended method for calculating MCI: Demuynck and Rehbeck (2021)
4) The Dual-Process Drift Diffusion Model: Evidence from Response Times
(with Andrew Caplin)
Economic Inquiry, 2016
Summary: We propose a model of response time and choice that borrows from dual-process models and the drift diffusion model. We conduct a simple experiment in which our hybrid model matches key properties of the data.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
5) Strategic Pricing with Rational Inattention to Quality
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017
Summary: I study how sellers set prices when facing buyers who are "rationally inattentive" to information about product quality, both sophisticated buyers and naive buyers who are rationally inattentive to their strategic beliefs.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Game Theory.
Previous: First version (experimental test)
6) Defaults and Attention: The Drop Out Effect
(with Andrew Caplin) [Appendix]
Revue Économique, 2017
Summary: We measure the drop out effect — where a default option is accepted with little regard for personal suitability — in an experiment using response time as a proxy for attention. We find this can offset benefits of high quality defaults.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Previous: NBER Working Paper 17988 (“drop outs” in an active choice)
7) What Do Consumers Learn from Regulator Ratings? Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Quality Disclosures
(with Tami Kim) [Appendix]
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021
Summary: Using online experiments, we provide evidence that there are two pathways through which individuals extract the information contained in regulator ratings: inference about the relative implications of a rating and inference about the absolute implications of a rating.
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Coverage: Kellogg Insight
8) Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure
(with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca)
AEJ: Microeconomics, 2021 AEJ: Micro Best Paper Award
Summary: We use laboratory experiments to directly test the forces that drive disclosure theory. We find a fundamental breakdown in the logic of unraveling: receivers are insufficiently skeptical about undisclosed information.
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files, Instructions for Additional Tasks
Previous: NBER Working Paper 21099
Coverage: Vox EU, HBS Working Knowledge
9) Predictive Power in Behavioral Welfare Economics
(with Elias Bouacida)
Journal of European Economics Association, 2021
Summary: Is it necessary to impose model structure in order to provide precise welfare guidance based on inconsistent choices? We address this question empirically by evaluating the predictive power of two behavioral welfare relations.
Topics: Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
10) Comparison of Decisions under Unknown Experiments
(with Andrew Caplin) [GitHub Repository]
Journal of Political Economy, 2021
Summary: We provide a necessary and sufficient condition that identifies when every experiment consistent with one set of decisions has a higher value of information than every experiment consistent with the other set of decisions.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Previous: Framing, Information, and Welfare (informational framing)
Previous working paper: Framing as Information Design
11) Complex Disclosure
(with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca) [Appendix]
Management Science, 2022 Featured Article
Summary: Using lab experiments, we implement a game of mandatory disclosure where senders are required to report their private information truthfully, but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find senders use complex disclosure over half the time.
Topics: Attention and Perception, Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
Coverage: Management Science Review
12) A Robust Test of Prejudice for Discrimination Experiments
(with Philip Marx)
Management Science, 2022 Fast Track
Summary: We show that if average outcomes in a discrimination experiment satisfy simple conditions, then this provides evidence that decision-makers are prejudiced, regardless of what they learned about individuals.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
13) Cognitive Costs and Misperceived Incentives: Evidence from the BDM Mechanism
(with Edwin Munoz-Rodriguez) [Appendix]
European Economic Review, 2022
Summary: We model agents as paying a cognitive cost to improve their understanding of the BDM's incentives and find experiment evidence in line with this model, suggesting that misperceptions respond to both the costs and benefits of better understanding these incentives.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
Previous: Misperceiving Mechanism
14) Perceptions and Detection of AI Use in Manuscript Preparation for Academic Journals
(with Nir Chemaya)
PLoS ONE, 2024
Summary: Rapid advances in Generative AI tools have produced both excitement and worry about how AI will impact academic writing. However, little is known about what norms are emerging around AI use in manuscript preparation or how these norms might be enforced. We address both gaps in the literature by conducting a survey of academics about whether it is necessary to report ChatGPT use in manuscript preparation and by running GPT-modified abstracts from published papers through a leading AI detection software.
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
15) Rational Inattention in Games: Experimental Evidence
(with David Almog) [Appendix]
Experimental Economics, 2024
Summary: To investigate whether attention responds rationally to strategic incentives, we experimentally implement a buyer-seller game in which a fully informed seller makes an offer to a buyer who faces cognitive costs to process information about the offer's value.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
Previous working paper: SSRN Working Paper 2674224
16) Rationalizable Learning
(with Andrew Caplin and Philip Marx)
Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Summary: What can an analyst infer from choice data about what a decision maker has learned? The key constraint we impose is that any learning must be rationalizable.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 30873
(with Andrew Caplin and Mark Dean) [Appendix and Instructions]
American Economic Review, 2011
Summary: We develop a search-theoretic choice experiment to study the impact of incomplete consideration on choice quality. We find that decisions can be understood using the satisficing model of Herbert Simon.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
2) A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception
(with Andrew Caplin)
Economic Journal, 2015
Summary: We introduce “state-dependent stochastic choice data” and an axiom called “No Improving Action Switches” (NIAS) that characterizes the choice behavior of an agent with private information about states of the world.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Previous: NBER Working Paper 17163 (experimental test)
Previous: Framing Effects and Optimization (framing effects)
3) Measuring Rationality with the Minimum Cost of Revealed Preference Violations
(with Mark Dean) [Appendix]
Review of Economics and Statistics, 2016
Summary: We offer a new measure of how close a set of choices is to satisfying the observable implications of preference maximization and apply it to a large, balanced panel of household level consumption data.
Topics: Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files, Updated MCI Files, MCI Source Code
Previous: Testing for Rationality with Consumption Data (preference homogeneity)
Previous: How Rational are your Choice Data? (experiment, number of preferences)
Recommended method for calculating MCI: Demuynck and Rehbeck (2021)
4) The Dual-Process Drift Diffusion Model: Evidence from Response Times
(with Andrew Caplin)
Economic Inquiry, 2016
Summary: We propose a model of response time and choice that borrows from dual-process models and the drift diffusion model. We conduct a simple experiment in which our hybrid model matches key properties of the data.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
5) Strategic Pricing with Rational Inattention to Quality
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017
Summary: I study how sellers set prices when facing buyers who are "rationally inattentive" to information about product quality, both sophisticated buyers and naive buyers who are rationally inattentive to their strategic beliefs.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Game Theory.
Previous: First version (experimental test)
6) Defaults and Attention: The Drop Out Effect
(with Andrew Caplin) [Appendix]
Revue Économique, 2017
Summary: We measure the drop out effect — where a default option is accepted with little regard for personal suitability — in an experiment using response time as a proxy for attention. We find this can offset benefits of high quality defaults.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Previous: NBER Working Paper 17988 (“drop outs” in an active choice)
7) What Do Consumers Learn from Regulator Ratings? Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Quality Disclosures
(with Tami Kim) [Appendix]
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021
Summary: Using online experiments, we provide evidence that there are two pathways through which individuals extract the information contained in regulator ratings: inference about the relative implications of a rating and inference about the absolute implications of a rating.
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Coverage: Kellogg Insight
8) Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure
(with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca)
AEJ: Microeconomics, 2021 AEJ: Micro Best Paper Award
Summary: We use laboratory experiments to directly test the forces that drive disclosure theory. We find a fundamental breakdown in the logic of unraveling: receivers are insufficiently skeptical about undisclosed information.
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files, Instructions for Additional Tasks
Previous: NBER Working Paper 21099
Coverage: Vox EU, HBS Working Knowledge
9) Predictive Power in Behavioral Welfare Economics
(with Elias Bouacida)
Journal of European Economics Association, 2021
Summary: Is it necessary to impose model structure in order to provide precise welfare guidance based on inconsistent choices? We address this question empirically by evaluating the predictive power of two behavioral welfare relations.
Topics: Behavioral Welfare Economics. Methods: Revealed Preference.
10) Comparison of Decisions under Unknown Experiments
(with Andrew Caplin) [GitHub Repository]
Journal of Political Economy, 2021
Summary: We provide a necessary and sufficient condition that identifies when every experiment consistent with one set of decisions has a higher value of information than every experiment consistent with the other set of decisions.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Previous: Framing, Information, and Welfare (informational framing)
Previous working paper: Framing as Information Design
11) Complex Disclosure
(with Ginger Jin and Michael Luca) [Appendix]
Management Science, 2022 Featured Article
Summary: Using lab experiments, we implement a game of mandatory disclosure where senders are required to report their private information truthfully, but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find senders use complex disclosure over half the time.
Topics: Attention and Perception, Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
Coverage: Management Science Review
12) A Robust Test of Prejudice for Discrimination Experiments
(with Philip Marx)
Management Science, 2022 Fast Track
Summary: We show that if average outcomes in a discrimination experiment satisfy simple conditions, then this provides evidence that decision-makers are prejudiced, regardless of what they learned about individuals.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
13) Cognitive Costs and Misperceived Incentives: Evidence from the BDM Mechanism
(with Edwin Munoz-Rodriguez) [Appendix]
European Economic Review, 2022
Summary: We model agents as paying a cognitive cost to improve their understanding of the BDM's incentives and find experiment evidence in line with this model, suggesting that misperceptions respond to both the costs and benefits of better understanding these incentives.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
Previous: Misperceiving Mechanism
14) Perceptions and Detection of AI Use in Manuscript Preparation for Academic Journals
(with Nir Chemaya)
PLoS ONE, 2024
Summary: Rapid advances in Generative AI tools have produced both excitement and worry about how AI will impact academic writing. However, little is known about what norms are emerging around AI use in manuscript preparation or how these norms might be enforced. We address both gaps in the literature by conducting a survey of academics about whether it is necessary to report ChatGPT use in manuscript preparation and by running GPT-modified abstracts from published papers through a leading AI detection software.
Topics: Information Disclosure. Methods: Experiments.
15) Rational Inattention in Games: Experimental Evidence
(with David Almog) [Appendix]
Experimental Economics, 2024
Summary: To investigate whether attention responds rationally to strategic incentives, we experimentally implement a buyer-seller game in which a fully informed seller makes an offer to a buyer who faces cognitive costs to process information about the offer's value.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Experiments, Revealed Preference.
Replication resources: Data and Analysis Files
Previous working paper: SSRN Working Paper 2674224
16) Rationalizable Learning
(with Andrew Caplin and Philip Marx)
Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Summary: What can an analyst infer from choice data about what a decision maker has learned? The key constraint we impose is that any learning must be rationalizable.
Topics: Attention and Perception. Methods: Revealed Preference.
Previous working paper: NBER Working Paper 30873